Cloning is unnatural why

T he cloning of macaque monkeys in China makes human reproductive cloning more conceivable. At the same time, it confirms how difficult it would be to clone a random adult — Adolf Hitler, say — from a piece of their tissue. And it changes nothing in the debate about whether such human cloning should ever happen. Since the cloning of Dolly the sheep by scientists in Scotland in , several other mammals have been cloned, including dogs, cats and pigs.

It shows that, with a bit of modification, the technique used for Dolly can create cloned, apparently healthy baby monkeys. Crucially, the cute duo were cloned from the genetic material in cells of a macaque foetus, not from an adult monkey. The important additional step — not needed for Dolly and her ilk — was to add some molecules to the egg before implantation that could activate genes involved in embryo development.

In contrast, Dolly was cloned from cells of an adult ewe. Eleven days ago, as I awaited my turn to testify at a congressional hearing on human reproductive cloning, one of five scientists on the witness list took the microphone.

Cloning would provide such an opportunity to grieving parents. Like many of the arguments against reproductive cloning listed below, this argument in favor of cloning, despite its emotional appeal, erroneously assumes that genetic determinism is true. The tacit implication here is that cloning is desirable because it somehow presents a way to cheat death. It is through cloning that his son could be, in some sense, resurrected.

Given that individuals have sought to clone their deceased pets, the idea that grieving parents would seek to clone a deceased child is not far-fetched.

Thomas Murray continues his article by disclosing that he too is a grieving father, having suffered the death of his twenty-year-old daughter who was abducted from her college campus and shot. Murray goes on to stress that, due to varying other influences outside of genetic duplication, a clone would not, in fact, be a mere copy of its genetic predecessor.

One interesting point is that both detractors of cloning e. Both assume that cloning recreates identity, and they differ only as to the desirability of that consequence. Yet, given that we have evidence that the robust form of genetic determinism these arguments assume is false Resnik and Vorhaus, ; Elliot, , both detractors and supporters of cloning who rely on it produce faulty arguments.

No child should have to bear the oppressive expectation that he or she will live out the life denied to his or her idealized genetic avatar…. Dan Brock further supports the contention that cloning in order to replace a deceased child is misguided Brock, It should be stressed, however, that this response targets a particular use of cloning one based on faulty assumptions , not the actual cloning procedure. Although SCNT is used to create embryos for therapeutic cloning, there is no intent to implant them in order to create children.

Rather, the intent is to use the cells of the embryo in order to further research that may ultimately lead to treatments or cures for certain afflictions. Therefore, a categorical ban on SCNT affects not just the prospect of reproductive cloning, but also the research that could be done with cloned embryos.

The first response maintains that, because therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning both implement SCNT, allowing the procedure to be perfected for therapeutic cloning makes it more likely that it will later be used for reproductive purposes Rifkin, ; Kass, The second response applies not just to therapeutic cloning, but to any type of embryo experimentation.

From the time that an ovum is fertilized and syngamy the fusion of two gametes to form a new and distinct genetic code has successfully taken place, there exists a subject, the embryo, which is a bearer of dignity, moral status, and moral rights. It is unethical to experiment on an embryo for the same reason it is unethical to experiment on any human being and since embryo experimentation often results in the destruction of the embryo, this equates to murdering the embryo Deckers, ; Oduncu, ; Novak, Typically, those who offer the second response e.

Because of the expectations that the cloned child will re-live the life of her genetic predecessor, the child would necessarily be deprived of her right to an open future. Because all children deserve to have a life and a future that is completely open to them in terms of its prospects Feinberg, , and because being the product of cloning would necessarily deprive the resulting child of these prospects, cloning is seriously immoral.

In a sense, this objection maintains that a cloned child would either lack the free will to live her life according to her own desire and goals or that, at the very least, her free will would be severely restricted by her parents or the society that has certain expectations of her given her genetic lineage.

The child would be destined to live in the shadows of her genetic predecessor Holm, This argument is unsuccessful in illustrating that there is something intrinsically morally wrong with cloning.

The subject of this objection is not cloning itself, but rather the erroneous attitude that parents will have in regard to their cloned child. Additionally, if the reason people treat cloned children unfavorably is due to their misconceptions about cloning, then the proper response is not to ban cloning at the expense of compromising procreative liberty, but rather work to rectify these prejudices and misconceptions Burley and Harris, As abovementioned, there is much evidence to suggest that genetic determinism is not true.

The same can be said about cloning Pence, and ; Wachbroit, Moreover, there is much evidence that, usually, the general public rejects genetic determinism Hopkins, However, this misconception may quickly be rectified simply by observing the unique personality of the cloned child, especially since her experiences and her nurture, removed by at least a generation, will be substantially different than that of her genetic predecessor Dawkins, ; Pence, According to this objection, our DNA is what endows each human being with uniqueness and dignity Callahan, Because cloning recreates a pre-existing DNA sequence, the cloned child would be denied that uniqueness and, therefore, her dignity would be compromised.

This objection appears to be an incarnation of the objection from the Right to an Open Future. Certainly the concerns are similar: that a cloned child would be deprived of her own individual identity because of her genetic origins.

However, whereas in the objection from the Right to an Open Future, the cloned child is deprived of individuality based on the perception of others and, as is developed above, this does not seem to really be an objection to the practice of cloning simpliciter , this objection indicates that there is something inherently individuality-compromising, and therefore dignity-compromising, in recreating an existing genetic code.

If this objection is successful, if recreating a pre-existing genetic code is intrinsically morally objectionable, then it would seem to present an objection to the actual cloning process. Callahan argues that there is something intrinsically identity-depriving, and therefore dignity-depriving, in duplicating a genetic code.

However, there is much evidence to counter this claim. As abovementioned, CC the cat neither looks nor acts like Rainbow, her genetic predecessor. However, the strongest evidence against this claim is the existence of identical multiples, who are, in essence, clones of nature Pence, ; Gould, However, there is no evidence that identical multiples feel this way, and there does not seem to be anything inherent about sharing a genetic code that compromises individuality Elliot, A cloned child would be gestated in a different uterine environment.

She would be born into either the same family, but with a different dynamic, as her genetic predecessor, or be born into a different family altogether. She would also likely be raised in a much different society e.

She would have different friends, attend different schools, play different games, watch different television shows, listen to different music.

The generational and historical differences between a clone and her genetic predecessor would undoubtedly go a long way when it comes to shaping the personality of the former Pence, ; Dawkins, ; Harris, ; Bor, While being genetically identical to a pre-existing person will most likely result in some similarities, it will certainly not be strong enough to deprive a cloned child of her individuality or dignity.

Moreover, concerns that genetic duplication compromises dignity overemphasize the role that genetics has as the source of human dignity. Human dignity, some philosophers have argued, has its source in virtue of our being persons and autonomous rational beings.

Since, presumably, a clone would still be a person and an autonomous rational being, a clone would certainly retain her human dignity Glannon, ; Elliot, Any method of procreation that does not implement traditional modes of conception, i. Moreover, advocates of this objection caution against removing God from the process of creation altogether, which, it is argued, is what reproductive cloning achieves Rikfin, But this is too vague; humans constantly interfere with nature in ways that are not morally criticized.

Almost all instances of medical advancements in the past years e. Would the same advocates of this objection against cloning object to artificial insulin injections to treat diabetes? Glannon, To be more extreme, almost everything humans engage in, from wearing clothing, to using phones and computers, to indoor plumbing, all, in some sense, interfere with some aspect of nature.

In addition, anything that thwarts the natural process of conception i. However, since key religious texts e. Many philosophers and ethicists who would otherwise support reproductive cloning concede that concern for the safety of children born via cloning is reason to caution against its use Harris, ; Glannon, The claim is that a cloned child would be in danger of suffering from severe genetic defects as a result of being a clone, or that cloning would result in a high number of severely defective embryos before one healthy human embryo is developed.

Even if a clone were to appear healthy at birth, there are concerns about health problems arising later in life. Even attempting to perfect human reproductive cloning would entail a trial and error approach that would lead to the destruction of many embryos, and may produce severely disabled children before a healthy one is born.

Suppose I desire to get pregnant, but am currently suffering from a physical ailment that would result in conceiving and birthing an infant with developmental impairments. Yet, if I were to wait two months, my ailment would pass and I would conceive a perfectly healthy baby.

Most people would agree that I should wait those two months; and, indeed, if I do not wait, many people would say that I acted wrongly. The resulting child, moreover, would most likely be identified as the victim of my actions. This intuitive response, however, is surprisingly tricky to defend. If harm is defined as making someone worse off than she otherwise would have been, it is difficult to maintain that I harmed the resulting child by my actions, even if she were impaired.

For the child that would have been born two months later would not have been the same child that is born if I do not wait; the impaired child would never have existed had I waited those two months. Because I did not harm her, I did not do anything morally wrong in this circumstance. The argument can best be standardized as follows:. I have only harmed an individual if I had made her worse off than she otherwise would have been had it not been for my actions.

Only if I have harmed someone can my action be deemed morally wrong. A child born with mental, physical, or developmental impairments usually does not have a life that is so bad that it renders nonexistence preferable. Therefore, a child born with mental, physical or developmental impairments is not made worse off by being brought into existence.

Therefore, I have usually done nothing morally wrong by deliberately bringing into existence a child who suffers from mental, physical, or developmental impairments. Using the nonidentity problem in the context of the reproductive cloning debate yields the following result: The alternative to being born a clone is not to be born at all.

As long as the cloned child has a life that, despite her genetic defect, is still worth living, then it would still be permissible to use cloning to bring her into being Lane, It is important to note, however, that the nonidentity problem is controversial, and that not all philosophers and ethicists agree with its conclusion Weinberg, ; Cohen, Natural reproduction can itself produce dangerous results.

If safety concerns about cloning are severe enough to ban its practice, this can only be justified if cloning were more risky that is, resulted in the birth of more children with more severe abnormalities than natural reproduction. Yet these parents are not prohibited from procreating because of this. Therefore, if parents are not prohibited from procreating on the grounds that they may pass along a severe genetic defect to their children, then it is difficult to deny a set of parents who can only rely on cloning for procreation the chance to do so based on safety reasons alone unless the abnormalities that may result from cloning are more severe than the abnormalities that may result from natural conception Brock, Similarly, objecting to cloning on the grounds that embryos are sacrificed in order to achieve a live birth is only a valid objection if the number of embryos lost are greater in cloning than in natural reproduction.

Finally, even if safety concerns are sufficient to warrant a current ban on human reproductive cloning, such concerns would be temporary, and would abate as cloning becomes safer.

Already stripped of its social function, the family would now be rendered biologically unnecessary, if not irrelevant". However, the broadest concern, and the concern that is often explicitly mentioned in relevant policy statements, is that human reproductive cloning, at some level, infringes notions of human dignity. Despite the existence of such policy statements, and despite almost universal public objection to the idea of reproduction cloning [ 16 ] there is, at least in the academic community, little agreement about the role of human dignity in this context.

Indeed, it has been suggested that "aside from the moral debate on whether the embryo is a human being arguments about human dignity do not hold up well under rational reflection". Below I briefly consider some of the reasons commentators remain skeptical of the claim that reproductive cloning infringes human dignity. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the relevant critiques, but to simply highlight a few of the counter arguments and substantive considerations that remain largely absent from a consideration of human dignity in the context of formal policy development.

At the heart of many of the human dignity arguments, often implicitly, is the idea that copying someone's genome is a morally problematic action. From the perspective of human dignity, the concern is founded on the assumption that a clone's autonomy will be compromised and that a person's genome is singularly important to human uniqueness.

Moreover, dignity is connected to human "uniqueness," though it is rarely explained why this is so. As Donald Bruce argues: "Willfully to copy the human genetic identity seems to go beyond something inherent in human dignity and individuality". Other statements simply assert that "the production of identical human individuals" [ 20 ] or the creation of a "genetic 'copy"' [ 21 ] should be banned.

The ethos that underlies these positions is, of course, both scientifically inaccurate and philosophically problematic. Without resolving the point, let us assume that, somehow, uniqueness is central to an individual's dignity.

We must ask, then, what role our genome has in our uniqueness and, more to the point, why copying it infringes human dignity. Our genome plays a key role in how we develop, but it is hardly determinative of who we are as individuals.

Is an identical twin's dignity compromised because of the mere existence of a sibling with an identical genome? More importantly, our genes do not, on their own, bind our future life to a particular course.

To believe otherwise is to adopt a deterministic view of the role of genes that is simply wrong. For example, shortly after the birth of Dolly Sir John Polkinghorne noted that " [o]ne of the by-products of the furor about Dolly has been to remind thoughtful people of the poverty and implausibility of a genetic reductionist account of human nature". For some, it is not the technical copying of a genome that gives rise to concerns about reproductive cloning, but the possibility that cloning will be used in a way that instrumentalizes the clone.

Again, this issue is likely tied to the concern that reproductive cloning would infringe the basic Kantian tenet to treat every human being as an end, not as a means.

However, it is the pressure or social expectations expectations that are necessarily informed by an inaccurate view of the role of genes placed on the individual clone that challenge the clone's human dignity, not the process of reproductive cloning.

As noted by Pattinson, the act of cloning could be implicated in an intention to "violate the rights of the clone in the future. That said, some argue that the mere act of cloning instrumentalizes the clone, "because the clone is created for the primary benefit not of the individual but of some third party as a means to an end".

First, it raises the interesting question of whether an act done prior to the birth of an individual can infringe the dignity of that individual. Second, if one accepts that our genes do not determine our life course or who we are as individuals, it is unclear how the technical act of cloning is more problematic, in relation to instrumentalism, than having children through IVF or, for that matter, making children the natural way for the sole purpose of producing an heir, labour or a means of old age support.

Of course, one could argue that, for the sake of consistency, these latter activities should also be banned. However, monitoring and assessing the motives of perspective parents would not, quite obviously, be a practical or appropriate state policy.

Finally, these kind of instrumentalist concerns assume that cloning would always be done for instrumentalist purposes, which may not be the case e. As noted by Steven Malby: "From the point of view of dignity, the desire to treat infertility clearly does not violate any of the parameters associated with an objective perspective of dignity".

Closely tied to the concerns regarding instrumentalism and the copying of an individual's genome, are the claims that the asexual nature of the process is "unnatural," that cloning is "replication" and not "reproduction" and that, therefore, by implication, cloning degrades human dignity. Gilbert Meilaender notes that we "find asexual reproduction only in the lowest forms of life. Children conceived sexually are 'begotten, not made. What we beget is like ourselves, equal to us in dignity and not at our disposal".

Though individuals may not feel comfortable with the process just as many did not feel comfortable with cadaveric research, in vitro fertilization and sperm donation , there must be something about the "replication" process that infringes human dignity.

It is unclear how, exactly, the asexual nature of the process, on its own, is problematic from the perspective of human dignity. Again, people may have nefarious motivations for using cloning — just as they may have questionable reasons for using IVF or having children the natural way — but aside from religious arguments regarding the moral status of the embryo and the significance of sexual union, there seems to be little to support the notion that "replication" infringes human dignity.

Meilaender's claim that being created by a sexual union that is beyond "reason or will" is central to our dignity seems to suggest that the thousands of children born as a result of reproductive technologies are, somehow, less worthy of dignity. In fact, if we lived in a society that allowed individuals created by cloning, or any other process, to be treated as less than human, reproductive cloning would be far from our most pressing policy concern.

It has also been suggested that reproductive cloning may adversely impact "communal dignity" or "the dignity of humankind". Indeed, most traditional legal applications of human dignity emphasize not the community but the protection of individual rights, often in an effort to guard against state imposed incursion upon individual autonomy.

However, even if one accepts a community view of human dignity, we see that in the context of reproductive cloning much of the concerns remain closely associated with individual autonomy. For example, Malby poses the question thus: "Does dignity impose a responsibility to protect a key feature of humanity our 'genetic heritage' , from which to an undetermined extent we acquire key capacities such as autonomy and the capacity for moral thought?

Early in the cloning debate, many of the above points were noted by well-known scholars from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. In Canada, for example, the government has recommended a ban on all forms of human cloning. The Health Canada information document that accompanied the publication of the proposed law simply claims, without any explanation of how or why, that human cloning "would be banned because it treats human beings as though they were objects and does not respect the individuality of human beings".

The Committee noted that the recommendation is based on a number of core principles, including human dignity, but the Committee makes no attempt to relate the recommendation to the notion of human dignity. Nevertheless, they do not connect this analysis to the issue of human dignity and both conclude that reproductive cloning still creates problems in relation to individual autonomy. For example, the President's Council concludes that " [w]hat matters is the cloned individual's perception of the significance of the 'precedent life' and the way that perception cramps and limits a sense of self and independence".

In fact, as I have noted elsewhere, cloning laws that are not accompanied by thoughtful policy analysis may have the unintended effect of legitimizes perceptions of genetic determinism.

This new person has no mother or father. But these arbitrary terms have no basis in science. Scientists define human cloning as the creation of a human embryo through cloning, described above. Once the cloned embryo is created, subsequent actions are irrelevant. Cloning ends with the creation of the embryo.